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Abstract
This paper analyzes how the adversarial and inquisitorial evidence collection
procedures aect nancial development. In investigating the true returns of insol-
vent entrepreneurs, the adversarial procedure relies on lawyers whereas the inquisi-
torial procedure relies on judges. Investors are willing to lend more in adversarial
than in inquisitorial legal systems if they are richer than entrepreneurs or if lawyers
are more productive than judges. Manipulation of evidence by lawyers has an am-
biguous impact on nance. The empirical evidence shows that a more inquisitorial
procedure is associated with less developed nancial markets.
1 Introduction
A puzzling stylized fact about legal origins is the apparent superior economic perfor-
mance of common law countries compared to civil law countries.1 La Porta et al. (1997)
document that common law countries have larger nancial markets while Mahoney (2001)
observe that economic growth is also higher in those countries. Hence the question: Does
the legal origin of a country matter for its economic performance? One key distinction
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between these two legal origins is the procedure to collect evidence for a trial: It is ad-
versarial in common law countries and inquisitorial in civil law countries. This paper
investigates whether this dierence can explain the better economic outcomes of common
law countries.
In adversarial legal systems, the collection of evidence is the task of lawyers. The role
of the judge is passive and he renders a decision depending on the evidence presented to
him. In inquisitorial legal systems, the role of the judge is more active as he participates
in the collection of evidence himself for example by appointing experts or interviewing
witnesses. This dierence has consequences on the process of evidence collection because
litigants can design the incentives of lawyers by contracting directly with them while this
would be more dicult with judges.2
A rst implication concerns the determinants of the investigative eort of judges and
lawyers. Because parties can choose their lawyer but not their judge, they take the
quality of investigation as given in inquisitorial systems whereas it is a choice variable
in adversarial systems. Rich parties, for example, can decide to hire a more competent
and more expensive lawyer in adversarial systems while they have to deal with the judge
they are assigned in inquisitorial systems. Also, incentives to search for evidence may be
greater in adversarial systems because litigants can condition the payment to the lawyer
on their success at trial. By contrast, judges are often tenured and their salary does not
depend on the outcomes of the trials.
A second implication concerns the choice of which evidence to present in court. Be-
cause parties want to win a trial and can design their contract with lawyers accordingly
in adversarial systems, their lawyers have an incentive to conceal or to manipulate the
evidence detrimental to their case in order to maximize their probability of winning the
trial. In case, for example, the opinion of an expert is needed for a case, lawyers may
appoint their friends or shop for the most lenient expert. By contrast, judges are not
given any such economic incentives.
2Although judicial corruption is common and can be seen as a form of contracting with the judge,
it is not related to adversarial and inquisitorial systems. Bond (2009) provides an analysis of the role of
corrupted judges on contracting. This paper also abstracts from judges's personal biases. See Gennaioli
and Shleifer (2008), Gennaioli (2009), and Gennaioli and Perotti (2009) for research on this topic.
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I study how these implications inuence nancial development. Consider a cashless
entrepreneur who borrows funds from an investor in order to run a risky project. If the
outcome of the project is dicult to observe, the investor may suspect the entrepreneur of
underreporting his earnings in order to repay less. Examples of this type of relationships
include fraudulent bankruptcy and shareholder expropriation. The role of the legal system
is then to investigate the true earnings of suspicious entrepreneurs and to punish those
entrepreneurs found guilty. Investors are willing to lend more funds when they expect
their nancial contract to be better enforced in court. Then, the question is: How do
adversarial and inquisitorial systems aect this mechanism?
First, if lawyers are better at collecting evidence than judges, for example because
their incentives are better designed, then the model naturally predicts that there is going
to be more nance in adversarial than in inquisitorial legal systems.
Second, the model predicts that those entrepreneurs willing to hire more competent
and expensive lawyers in adversarial systems can enjoy a higher quality of contract en-
forcement than the same entrepreneurs in inquisitorial systems, who do not have the
choice of their judge. The opposite is also true. If entrepreneurs are only willing to hire
less competent and cheaper lawyers, they can face a lower quality of enforcement in adver-
sarial systems than they would in inquisitorial systems. This model thus suggests that,
if nancial markets are more developed in common law countries, it could be because
similar investors enjoy a higher quality of enforcement in adversarial than they would in
inquisitorial legal systems. This is only true if investors are wealthier than entrepreneurs.
Third, the model predicts that the possibility to manipulate evidence has an ambigu-
ous impact on nancial development. Manipulation of evidence increases the probability
to nd an entrepreneur guilty, independently of whether he is guilty or innocent. Thus,
the state is better veried when the entrepreneur is guilty and worse veried when the
entrepreneur is innocent. This has two eects: First, investors are better-o and are
willing to lend more. Second, entrepreneurs require to be compensated for this loss, and
investors are willing to lend less as a response.
Finally, the paper documents the relationship between a new measure of how inquisi-
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torial a legal system is and two measures of nancial development - the size of the credit
market and stock market capitalization. This relationship is decreasing and is robust to
controls that proxy for other channels related to legal origins.
Section 2 presents the main dierences between adversarial and inquisitorial legal
systems. Section 3 builds a model of law and nance. Section 4 compares the level of
nancial development in adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems. Section 5 documents
some empirical evidence. Section 6 concludes. Alternative legal environments are studied
in the Appendix.
1.1 Related Literature and Contribution
The present paper is not the rst to provide an explanation for the higher economic
outcomes of common law countries compared to civil law countries. It is the rst, how-
ever, to rely on adversarial and inquisitorial procedures. See La Porta et al. (2008) for
a detailed review. A rst strand of the literature focuses on key dierences between be-
tween common and civil law: (i) In common law countries, judges are more independent
from the government, and this fosters the protection of private property against state ex-
propriation. (ii) Legal rules in common law countries are more adaptable to a changing
environment and therefore more ecient because of the ability of common law judges to
make the law through precedents. Posner (2007) makes this argument and Beck et al.
(2003) nds some empirical support for it. Another strand of literature argues that legal
origin is a proxy for something unrelated to law. Two examples of such alternative theo-
ries are: (iii) The proportion of catholics is higher in civil law countries and is negatively
correlated with creditor rights. See Stulz and Williamson (2003). (iv) Politics is more
left-wing in civil law countries, thus favoring workers at the expense of investors. See Roe
(2000).
The literature on adversarial and inquisitorial systems has focused on comparing the
eciency of these two systems within the court while this paper analyzes the consequences
of these two systems on the economy. According to Shin (1998), the adversarial procedure
produces more information because the judges receive two signals instead of one in the
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inquisitorial procedure. Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) nd that adversarial systems are
more ecient because less rents have to be given to two biased parties rather than to one
neutral party to ensure eort. In Froeb and Kobayashi (2001), the average of two biased
pieces of evidence is as informative as the evidence collected by a neutral party. Parisi
(2002) analyzes rent-seeking in adversarial and inquisitorial systems.
This paper is part of a recent eort to integrate more micro-founded legal systems
into economic models. Along these lines are the works of Gennaioli (2009) and of Gen-
naioli and Perotti (2009), with a focus on the impact on the form of contracts of judges'
personal biases and limited expertise. The impact of corrupted judges on contracting is
considered in Bond (2009). Anderlini et al. (2010) compare the impact of case law and
statute law on economic growth. Massenot (2010) studies the role of lawyers and the
litigation environment on the economy. The present paper's contribution is to focus on
the role of the process of evidence collection on the economy. These previous papers are
to be contrasted with the literature on investor protection and limited enforcement, that
considers law as a black box. In this literature, law is modelled exogenously as a mon-
etary punishment and/or a probability of detection. One reference on economic growth
is Castro et al. (2004), who nd that better investor protection has two opposing eects
on economic growth: It makes entrepreneurs more credit-worthy but the resulting in-
crease in the interest rate reduces future capital accumulation. Cooley et al. (2004) show
that economic volatility decreases with the quality of contract enforcement. Shleifer and
Wolfenzon (2002) provide a model consistent with a number of stylized facts on corporate
nance and investor protection.
2 Dierences Between Adversarial and Inquisitorial
Legal Systems
The main dierence between the two systems is the identity of the investigator (Pos-
ner, 2007). Figure 1 represents a typical trial involving three parts: defense, investigation
and decision. While the defense part is generally done by a lawyer and the decision part
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Figure 1: Inquisitorial and adversarial procedures
is the responsibility of a judge independently of the legal family, the investigation part
is conducted by lawyers in adversarial systems and by judges in inquisitorial systems. In
reality, lawyers also play a role in the investigation in inquisitorial systems but this paper
abstracts from it in order to make the distinction between the two systems appear more
starkly. Also, some countries actually have hybrid legal systems. The proposition to sup-
press the juge d'instruction (investigating judge) in France is one example. Adversarial
and inquisitorial systems remain, however, an essential feature to distinguish common
law from civil law (Merryman, 1969).
This paper shall focus on three implications of adversarial and inquisitorial legal
systems on the process of evidence collection:
1. Incentives to search Because of its competitive nature, the adversarial process
induces lawyers to search harder than judges for evidence (Posner, 2007). This
could be because the payment to lawyers is contingent on their success at trial, or
because of a repeated relationship between the lawyer and his client. By contrast,
judges do not face such economic incentives.
2. Income eects The wealth of litigants matters to a greater extent in adversarial
than in inquisitorial legal systems. Judges investigate the same way in inquisitorial
systems, independently of whether litigants are rich or poor. By contrast, a richer
litigant in adversarial systems can aord a better lawyer or induce him to provide
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more eort.
3. Manipulation of evidence Because they are given dierent incentives, lawyers
only present the evidence that favors their case at trial and conceal or destroy
any detrimental evidence. By contrast, judges present all the evidence they have
found. This is a standard assumption in the literature (Shin, 1998; Dewatripont
and Tirole, 1999; Froeb and Kobayashi, 2001). Manipulation of evidence is often
seen as a downside of adversarial systems (Tullock et al., 1997).
3 A Model of Law and Finance
This section builds a model of law and nance to better understand the link between
adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems and nancial development. It presents a stan-
dard setting of nancial contracting in which a dispute between an entrepreneur and an
investor can arise. Adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems solve this dispute dierently
and thus, aect ex ante the nancing decision.
3.1 The Environment
An economy is populated with entrepreneurs and investors who live for two periods.
There are two goods in the economy: capital k and a nal good y. Capital is used to
produce the nal good and can be stored, while the nal good is used as numeraire or is
consumed. Everybody is risk neutral and consumes during the second period.
In the rst period, cashless entrepreneurs borrow capital k from investors and use it
to produce y units of nal good. Their technology is given by:
y = ~ak; (1)
where ~a is productivity. It can be high (~a = a1 > 1) with probability p1 or low (~a = a0 <
1) with probability p0.
Entrepreneurs raise capital k by contracting a loan with investors. At the time of
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contracting, nobody knows the realization of the productivity ~a of the project. The loan
contract species a repayment r(~a) contingent on the level of productivity. Once the
entrepreneur received the capital, he observes privately his productivity, announces it
to the investor and repays him accordingly. The problem is that the entrepreneur has
an incentive to claim his project failed in order to maximize his payo. Whenever the
entrepreneur announces that his project failed, the investor knows that the entrepreneur
may not have respected the terms of the contract.
To solve this conict of interest, investors can sue entrepreneurs to verify their true
productivity. The threat of litigation is the only instrument available to investors to
ensure that entrepreneurs do not prefer to default opportunistically. The following section
describes more precisely this litigation process.
3.2 Law
When investors decide to litigate, they have the possibility to hire investigators whose
job is to collect evidence on the productivity of entrepreneurs. Investigators spend eort
collecting evidence that they then present in court. If the evidence is convincing enough
to convict the entrepreneur, the court awards damages d to the investor.
Collection of evidence Investigators draw evidence from a distribution that de-
pends on the true state of the world a^j, j = 0; 1. The evidence a0 is uncovered with
probability j and the evidence a1 with probability 1   j. I also assume that evidence
consistent with the true state of the world is more likely to be uncovered by setting
0 > 1.
Investors make a payment c to investigators that inuences the quantity of evidence
collected. Investigators end up with two pieces of evidence with probability q, one piece
of evidence with probability L(c) and no pieces of evidence with probability 1 L(c) q,
with L = A if the legal system is adversarial and L = I if the legal system is inquisitorial.
I also assume (0) = 0, 0 > 0, 00 < 0 and limc!1 (c) = 1  q. As in Dewatripont and
Tirole (1999), the point of introducing the possibility of nding two conicting pieces of
evidence is to open the door to manipulation of evidence.
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The total cost of investigation for investors is equal to Lc, where L is the marginal
cost of investigation. The parameter A can be interpreted as the marginal cost of
investigation from the point of view of a particular investor. A higher value may mean
that the investor is poorer and thus less willing to pay for litigation. By contrast, the
parameter I can be interpreted as the willingness to pay of society for its legal system.
Entrepreneurs can defend their case by presenting evidence in their favor. They can
pay an exogenous cost cE that allows them to nd hard evidence a0 with some probability
E strictly less than one. The parameter E is kept exogenous because entrepreneurs
know the true state of the world and thus do not need to investigate it. It also avoids the
complications of modelling litigation like a contest (Katz, 1988; Parisi, 2002; Massenot,
2010). The parameter E could be made contingent on the true state of the world and on
the wealth of entrepreneurs, but for clarity of exposition, the rest of the paper assumes
E = 0. Indeed, the only eect of entrepreneurs presenting evidence is to decrease their
probability of being convicted. All the results of the paper hold as long as E < 1.
Conviction The decision to convict only depends on the evidence presented to the
judge. Conviction occurs when one piece of evidence a1 is presented. If two conicting
pieces of evidence are presented, conviction does not occur. In making a decision, the
judge does not take into account the distribution of guilty and innocent entrepreneurs
because this type of evidence is not admissible in court.
We can now compute the probability XLij of convicting an entrepreneur, conditional
on the origin of the legal system L, the true type of the entrepreneur i = 0; 1, and
the number of pieces of evidence uncovered j = 0; 1; 2. Table 1 gives the resulting
analytical expressions for the probabilities of conviction as a function of the quantity of
evidence uncovered and of the true productivity of the entrepreneur. The table shows
that adversarial and inquisitorial systems only dier when two pieces of evidence are
found, that is when the possibility of manipulation of evidence arises. Also, one can
easily check that XAi2 > XIi2, that is entrepreneurs are more often found guilty in
adversarial systems than in inquisitorial systems, independently of whether they are guilty
or innocent. Finally, when no evidence is found, the probability of conviction is zero.
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Table 1: Probabilities of conviction
Adversarial system Inquisitorial system
XAi0 = 0 XIi0 = 0
XAi1 = 1  i XIi1 = 1  i
XAi2 = (1  i)2 XIi2 = 1  2i
We can now compute the ex ante probabilities of conviction XLi conditional on the
true productivity of the entrepreneur:
XLi(c) = (c)XLi1 + qXLi2 (2)
The general quality of vericationXL1 XL0 increases with the payment c to investigators
because this increases the probability of nding one piece of evidence instead of nothing.
Likewise, it increases with q because nding two pieces of evidence is better than just
nding one. This benet is, however, smaller for adversarial systems because evidence
can be manipulated.
The downside with the possibility of manipulation of evidence is that innocent en-
trepreneurs are more often found guilty. The benet is that guilty entrepreneurs are also
more often convicted. It is thus ambiguous whether the general quality of verication
XL1 XL0 is better in one legal system or the other. Some algebra shows that the quality
of verication is better in adversarial systems if 0 + 1 > 1 and worse otherwise.
Underlying assumptions First, courts are perfectly able to enforce contracts that
only include variables observable at no cost like the repayment r or the amount lent k.
Their imperfections lie in their inability to enforce contracts that depend on variables
that are costly to observe, like productivity ~a. Second, the allocation of litigation costs
is made according to the American rule in which investors bear their litigation costs
independently of the outcome of the trial. Section A.1 considers the case of the English
rule which imposes that an entrepreneur who is found guilty has to reimburse the investor
his litigation costs. Third, I assume that whenever a dispute arises, the parties end up
in court. Section A.2 shows that out-of-court settlement is not an interesting option in
this model.
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3.3 Finance
Investors oer nancial contracts to entrepreneurs. These contracts are dened by
an amount to be lent k, a repayment contingent on the level of productivity announced
by the entrepreneur, r0 if the entrepreneur announces low productivity and r1 if the
entrepreneur announces high productivity, and litigation spending c. The objective of
the investor is to maximize his expected utility. With probability p0, the project fails and
the investor is paid r0, he receives expected compensatory damages X0d, and he pays the
litigation costs c. With probability p1, he is paid the high return r1. Finally, his utility
function also includes the opportunity cost of lending, which is equal to k, the benet of
storing. Then, the investor solves:
max
r0;r1;c;k
p0(r0 +XL0d  Lc) + p1r1   k: (3)
Investors only oer contracts that induce entrepreneurs to reveal truthfully their pro-
ductivity. Otherwise, all the entrepreneurs would announce a low productivity and it
would not be a protable activity to lend. This gives us an incentive compatibility con-
straint for high productivity entrepreneurs. It tells us that the cost r1 of announcing a
high productivity should be lower than the cost r0 +XL1d of announcing a low produc-
tivity and facing potential litigation costs. The incentive compatibility constraint of low
productivity entrepreneurs is not presented as no entrepreneurs would want to pay some-
thing if they do not have to. The incentive compatibility constraint of high productivity
entrepreneurs is given by the following equation:
r1  r0 +XL1d: (4)
Entrepreneurs have an outside opportunity that gives them a level of utility u that
corresponds to the value of the nancial contracts oered by alternative investors. This
gives a participation constraint for entrepreneurs, which tells us that the expected utility
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of an entrepreneur should be greater than u:
p0(a0k   r0  XL0d) + p1(a1k   r1)  u: (5)
Finally, entrepreneurs are protected by limited liability and they cannot be asked for
a repayment that would give them a negative prot. This repayment is further reduced
by the possibility of errors of type 1 in the judicial process. This type of errors happens
when innocent entrepreneurs are convicted. Innocent entrepreneurs pay the expected
damages to competitive insurers who pay the damages in case of conviction. This gives
the following limited liability constraint:
a0k   r0  XL0d  0: (6)
These three constraints can be shown to be binding. Solving for this system of three
equations and three unknowns gives the following nancial contract as a function of c:
r0 = a0k  XL0d; (7)
r1 = a0k + (XL1  XL0)d; (8)
k =
u+ p1d(XL1  XL0)
1  a0 : (9)
After replacing these solutions in Equation (3), we can solve for the optimal payment
c to the investigator. The investor chooses c such that its marginal cost is equal to its
marginal benet. As a consequence, the payment c decreases with L and increases with
damages d.
Investors compete with each other by oering contracts of value u to entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs shop around and choose the contract that maximizes their utility. Since
there is perfect competition between investors, we get the following zero-prot condition:
p1r1 + p0(r0 +XL0d  Lc) = k: (10)
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Replacing Equations (7), (8), and (9) into Equation (10) gives the level of utility u for
entrepreneurs delivered by the equilibrium contract. Replacing this value into Equation
(9) gives the equilibrium stock of capital k:
k =
p1d(XL1  XL0)  p0Lc
1  a0 : (11)
Consider a change in the technology of investigation. For example, let XL0 increase
for a given level of c. Equation (11) tells us that nancial development will then be lower.
The reason is that if an entrepreneur expects to be more often found guilty although he
is innocent, he can only be asked for a lower repayment r0 because of limited liability.
The prot of investors becomes negative and they adjust by lending less.
Let now XL1 increase for a given c. Equation (11) tells us that nancial development
will then be higher. This is because a higher probability of convicting guilty entrepreneurs
relaxes their incentive compatibility constraint. This allows the investor to ask for a
higher repayment r1 in case of success. The zero-prot condition of investors tells us that
investors will also lend more.
An increase in damages d has the two eects described in the last two paragraphs.
First it makes it easier to enforce contracts and second it strengthens the limited liability
of entrepreneurs. The overall eect on nancial development can be shown to be positive
because XL1 > XL0.
Finally, an improvement in the quality of contract enforcement (XL1 XL0)d increases
nancial development k. This is consistent with a number of references that have iden-
tied a positive role of contract enforcement on the economy (North, 1990). This is also
consistent with more recent empirical work (Jappelli et al., 2005).
4 Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Legal Systems
What happens to nancial development if an economy switches from an adversarial to
an inquisitorial legal system? Because we have identied three dierences between the two
systems, we answer this question in three steps. In each step, we shut down one dierence
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and analyze the impact of the other dierence on the economy. The two legal systems
are equivalent if we set (i)A = I , (ii) q = 0, and (iii) I = A. The rst restriction
implies that lawyers are equally productive as judges. The second restriction rules out
the possibility of nding conicting evidence and thus the possibility of manipulation of
evidence. The third restriction implies that the payments to the investigators are the
same in both systems, such that the two investigators provide the same amount of eort.
Incentives to search If lawyers are better at collecting evidence than judges, for
example because they receive a payment contingent on their success at trial, then we get
the following result:
Result 1 Holding q = 0 and I = A, nancial development k is larger in adversarial
systems than in inquisitorial systems if lawyers are better at collecting evidence than
judges (A > I).
This result follows directly from positive impact on nance of a better quality of state
verication.
Income eects We then analyze the impact of the wealth of investors on nancial
development.We get the following result:
Result 2 Holding q = 0 and A = I , nancial development k is larger in adversar-
ial systems than in inquisitorial systems if the marginal cost of litigation in adversarial
systems is lower than in inquisitorial systems (A < I).
We have found that the equilibrium level of litigation spending c is a decreasing
function of L. As a consequence, the level of litigation spending c is higher in adversarial
than in inquisitorial systems. Then, Equation (11) is a hump-shaped function of c, so
this result is not trivial. It can be shown, however, that the equilibrium is always on the
increasing part of this function, so that we can restrict our analysis to this part. It takes
a few lines of algebra to show that the level of c that maximizes k in Equation (11) is
always larger than the level of c that solves the problem of the investor. Intuitively, when
investors choose how much to spend on litigation, they internalize the positive eect that
this would have on their prot through a bigger loan. As a consequence, they would not
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choose a level of litigation spending that would induce them to lend less. Then, the result
holds.
The model is consistent with the empirical evidence if and only if we set A < I .
This restriction can be interpreted as a lower marginal cost of investigation for investors
than for society. This restriction can be reasonable if we think of conicts between, for
example, banks and entrepreneurs, where banks have the capacity hire more competent
lawyers. Then, a possible explanation for the higher level of nancial development in
common law countries is that rich investors are able to enjoy a higher quality of contract
enforcement and are thus willing to lend more in adversarial than in inquisitorial legal
systems. This is because the adversarial legal system allows rich investors to pay lawyers
as much as they want while the inquisitorial system restricts them in doing so. A corollary
is that relatively poor parties in a dispute, for example workers, should achieve a lower
quality of contract enforcement in adversarial systems than in inquisitorial systems. This
could be consistent with the work of Botero et al. (2004), who nd systematic dierences
in the labor market and in labor regulation across legal origins. Testing this hypothesis
is, however, outside the scope of this paper.
An interesting extension is to allow for heterogeneous agents. The centralized inquisi-
torial legal system would not allow each agent to enjoy their favorite level of quality of
enforcement. By contrast, in adversarial systems, the choice of how much to spend on
litigation is decentralized. Let us assume now that there is a proportion of investors with
a low L0 (rich investors), while the rest of investors have a high L1 (poor investors). As
a result of prot maximization, rich investors have a high willingness to pay for litigation
(a high c) while poor investors have a low willingness to pay (a low c). Then the following
result holds:
Result 3 Holding q = 0, A = I , and Ai = Ii with i = 0; 1, a larger inequality L1  
L0 between litigants decreases nancial development k in adversarial systems compared
to inquisitorial systems.
This result holds because k is concave in c. Intuitively, following a switch from an ad-
versarial to an inquisitorial legal system, rich investors decrease their lending by a smaller
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amount than poor investors increase theirs. This mechanism is similar to Banerjee and
Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993), who claim that reducing inequality is ben-
ecial for economic growth under credit constraints and a concave production function.
This result is in contrast to a claim made by Posner (2007) that redistribution through the
legal process is mostly harmful for economic growth because it impedes the functioning
of the invisible hand.
Manipulation of Evidence We nally analyze the role of manipulation of evidence
on nancial development. We get the following result:
Result 4 Holding A = I and A = I , a greater possibility to manipulate evidence (a
larger q) increases nancial development k in adversarial systems compared to inquisito-
rial systems if and only if 1 + 0  1, and strictly decreases it otherwise.
A higher level of q implies larger probabilities of conviction XL1 and XL0. Financial
development depends positively onXL1 and negatively onXL0, thus it is not clear whether
nancial development is higher or not once the possibility to manipulate evidence is
introduced.
This result is to some extent unexpected as manipulation of evidence is often blamed
for being one downside of adversarial systems (Tullock et al., 1997). By contrast, this
paper suggests that manipulation of evidence may be good for the economy as it may
help convicting guilty entrepreneurs. The problem is that at the same time manipulation
of evidence contributes to convicting innocent entrepreneurs more often, which is bad for
the economy. The net eect of manipulation of evidence is thus ambiguous and depends
on the distribution of signals.
5 Some Empirical Evidence
This section presents some empirical evidence on the relationship between the pro-
cedure to collect evidence for a trial and nancial development. First, it builds a new
indicator of how inquisitorial a country is. Second, it documents its relationship with two
standard measures of nancial development: private credit and market capitalization.
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Finally, it examines the robustness of the results by controlling for alternative channels.
5.1 Data
Inquisitorial indicator I build a new indicator of how inquisitorial a legal system
is. I use four variables from Djankov et al. (2003) that describe the procedure to evict
a tenant in court: (i) Judge cannot introduce evidence (EVI), (ii) Judge cannot reject
irrelevant evidence (IRR), (iii) Mandatory prequalication of questions (PREQ), and
(iv) Oral interrogation only by judge (ORAL). These variables are equal to 1 when
the corresponding statement is true, 0 otherwise. The rst two variables measure how
adversarial a system is, while the last two measure how inquisitorial it is. The inquisitorial
indicator (INQ) of how inquisitorial a legal system is computed as follows: 4*INQ=(1-
EVI)+(1-IRR)+PREQ+ORAL. The same measures are also available for the procedure
to recover a bounced check in court and give similar results.
Table 2 presents the data obtained. The indicator is available for 104 countries.
It ranges from 0 to 1, with a mean of .5. A higher value means a more inquisitorial
procedure. The correlation between this indicator and a common law dummy is about
0.3, so this indicator contains some dierent information from legal origin. Chile, for
example, is a civil law country but scores 0 on the indicator. By contrast, the UK is quite
inquisitorial for a common law country.
Proxy for legal origins Besides a common law dummy variable (from Djankov et al.,
2003), I use as controls two alternative measures that proxy for a legal origin channel.
The legal origins theory states that common law countries are more nancially developed
because they have higher investor protection. I thus use the following measures of investor
protection: a measure of creditor protection from Djankov et al. (2007) and a measure of
shareholder protection from Djankov et al. (2008). The ability of judges to make the law
is one possible explanation for why investor protection is higher in common law countries.
I thus use the legal justication index of Djankov et al. (2003) as a measure of the ability
of judges to make the law. Levine uses additional proxies for legal origins from La Porta
et al. (2004). The results using these variables are not presented because the number of
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observations drops to less than thirty.
Financial development I use the measures of nancial development from the World
Bank: a measure of the ratio of private credit to GDP and a measure of the ratio of stock
market capitalization to GDP. I also use the logarithm real GDP per capita from Heston
et al. (2009) as a control. All these variables are averaged over the period 1990-2005.
5.2 Results
Figures 2 and 3 plot the inquisitorial indicator against the two measures of nancial
development. They both show a negative relationship. This is consistent with earlier
research that found a positive relationship between common law and nance (La Porta
et al., 1997).
Figures 3 and 4 show the results from an OLS regression with robust standard errors
of the level of nancial development on the inquisitorial indicator and several controls:
the logarithm of GDP per capita, investor protection (creditor rights for private credit,
anti self-dealing for market capitalization), the legal justication index, and common
law. The coecients on the inquisitorial indicator are negative and signicant in most
specications. However, two specications present less conclusive results: the rst one
is when market capitalization is regressed on the anti-self dealing index, the coecient
of the inquisitorial indicator is reduced but remains signicant; the second one is when
private credit is regressed on common law, the coecient of the inquisitorial indicator is
reduced and loses its signicance. Its size, however, is slightly larger than the coecient
of common law. Overall, the results indicate that switching from an adversarial to an
inquisitorial legal system reduces the two measures of nancial development by about 20
to 30 percentage points.
This section suggests that the procedure to collect evidence for a trial are likely to
matter for nancial development even when controlling for alternative relevant channels.
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6 Conclusion
Why do common law countries have larger nancial markets than civil law countries?
the paper addresses this puzzle by focusing on the procedure of evidence collection: It is
adversarial in common law countries and inquisitorial in civil law countries. The main
dierence between these two procedures is the identity of the investigator: a lawyer
in adversarial systems and a judge in inquisitorial systems. The model predicts that
manipulation of evidence has an ambiguous impact on nancial development. More
promising explanations could be that: (i) lawyers are given better incentives than judges
to search for evidence, thus leading to more nance in adversarial legal systems; (ii)
investors enjoy a higher quality of contract enforcement in adversarial than in inquisitorial
legal systems. This is made possible by the decentralized nature of the adversarial process
that allows rich parties to spend more on litigation and thus to improve the quality of
contract enforcement.
The paper suggests a new channel through which law can aect nance. These results,
however, should be taken with caution. Further research is needed to assess the impor-
tance of this channel. For example, more detailed data on the procedures of evidence
collection and on the demand for lawyers of banks and rms would be very helpful.
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A APPENDIX: Alternative Legal Environments
In this section, I show how dierent assumptions on the legal environment aect the
previous results.
A.1 English Rule
So far, the paper used the American rule of allocation of litigation costs, that is the
investor always had to incur his litigation costs whatever the outcome of the trial. With
the English rule, the loser of the trial has to compensate the winner for his litigation costs.
In the context of this model this means that whenever an entrepreneur of low productivity
loses a trial he has to reimburse the investor his litigation costs. This rule modies the
program of the investor in the following way: First the investor only has to incur the
litigation cost when he loses a trial, which happens with probability 1 X0. Second, all
the damages that entrepreneurs have to pay when they lose a trial are increased by the
litigation costs c. The problem of the investor becomes:
max
r0;r1;c;k
p0 (r0 +X0(d+ c)  (1 X0)c) + p1r1   k; (12)
such that
r1 = r0 +X1(d+ c)); (13)
k(a0   r0  X0(d+ c)) = 0; (14)
p0(a0k   r0  X0(d+ c)) + p1(a1k   r1) = u: (15)
Allowing investors to compete with each other and solving the model as before gives
us the stock of capital:
k =
p1(d+ c)(X1  X0)  (1 X0)p0c
1  a0 : (16)
The rst consequence of adopting the English rule is that it increases the amount of
damages paid by guilty entrepreneurs to d + c instead of d. The second eect is to
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decrease the expected litigation spending to (1 X0)p0c instead of p0c due to the fact
that investors only pay when they lose the trial. These two eects have two consequences:
First, they increase the optimal litigation spendings because the marginal benet of
litigation increases while its cost decreases; Second, they make borrowers more credit-
worthy for the same reasons. The overall consequence of the English rule is more nancial
development, independently of the legal family.
Softer English rule. In many countries, the English rule is not strictly applied in the
sense that if the investor would incur large costs of litigation for example by choosing a
very expensive attorney, only a fraction of these costs may have to be reimbursed. My
results are however still valid with this modication of the allocation rule.
A.2 Out-of-court Settlement
In order to save the litigation costs, parties may decide to settle out of court. One
party will make an out-of-court settlement oer and the dispute will be settled if the
other party accepts the oer. In the real world, out-of-court settlement occurs in a large
majority of conicts.
The maximum oer investors can make such that high productivity entrepreneurs an-
nouncing low productivity are indierent between paying the expected ne and accepting
the out-of-court settlement oer is X1d. It does not change anything for low productivity
entrepreneurs but all the high productivity entrepreneurs anticipate out-court settlement
and will claim being of low productivity because by doing so their expected ne would
be equal to X0d instead of X1d. In other words, the contract is not incentive-compatible
anymore because the screening ability of the legal system is no longer used. In this case,
legal systems do not aect the eciency of loan contracts as no lending occurs.
This model does not make a very interesting case for out-of-court settlement. This is
because there are no alternative instruments to screen entrepreneurs. To keep the problem
interesting, I thus assume that the investors commit to go to court when entrepreneurs
announce low productivity.
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A.3 A Social Planner in Inquisitorial Systems
The paper has assumed that the resources spent on litigation in inquisitorial systems
are the result of prot maximization by investors, an unreasonable assumption. In this
section, I allow a social planner to maximize the sum of investors' and entrepreneurs'
prots in order to decide on the quality of contract enforcement, while nothing is changed
in adversarial systems. The program of the social planner in inquisitorial systems is now:
max
r0;r1;c;k
p0(a0k   c) + p1a1   k; (17)
under the same constraints than before. The objective function is now larger for any
level of c because it takes into account the positive eect of a larger c on the prot of
the entrepreneur. As a consequence, this leads to one more dierence between the two
systems, as the level of litigation spendings c and thus the quality of contract enforcement
in inquisitorial systems is now larger.
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Table 2: Presentation of the data
Code Country Inquisitorial Legal origin
ARG Argentina .5 FR
AUS Australia .25 UK
AUT Austria .75 GER
BEL Belgium .5 FR
BGD Bangladesh .5 UK
BLZ Belize .5 UK
BOL Bolivia .75 FR
BRA Brazil 1 FR
BRB Barbados .25 UK
BWA Botswana .25 UK
CAN Canada .25 UK
CHE Switzerland .25 GER
CHL Chile 0 FR
CIV Cote d'Ivoire .5 FR
COL Colombia .5 FR
CRI Costa Rica .75 FR
CYP Cyprus .5 UK
DEU Germany 0 GER
DOM Dominican Rep. .75 FR
ECU Ecuador .75 FR
EGY Egypt .25 FR
ESP Spain .5 FR
FIN Finland .25 SC
FRA France .75 FR
GBR UK .75 UK
GHA Ghana .25 UK
GRC Greece .25 FR
GTM Guatemala .25 FR
HKG Hong Kong .5 UK
HND Honduras 1 FR
IDN Indonesia .75 FR
IND India .5 UK
IRL Ireland .5 UK
ISL Iceland .5 SC
ISR Israel 0 UK
ITA Italy .5 FR
JAM Jamaica .5 UK
JOR Jordan .75 FR
JPN Japan .25 GER
KEN Kenya .5 UK
KOR Korea .5 GER
LBN Lebanon .75 FR
(Continued)
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Table 2 { Continued
Code Country Inquisitorial Legal origin
LKA Sri Lanka .5 UK
LUX Luxembourg 1 FR
MAR Morocco .5 FR
MEX Mexico .5 FR
MLT Malta .5 FR
MOZ Mozambique 1 FR
MWI Malawi .25 UK
MYS Malaysia 0 UK
NAM Namibia .5 UK
NGA Nigeria .25 UK
NLD Netherlands .25 FR
NOR Norway .25 SC
NZL New Zealand .5 UK
PAK Pakistan .5 UK
PAN Panama .5 FR
PER Peru .75 FR
PHL Philippines .25 FR
PRY Paraguay 1 FR
SEN Senegal .25 FR
SGP Singapore .25 UK
SLV El Salvador .75 FR
SWE Sweden .25 SC
SWZ Swaziland .5 UK
THA Thailand .5 UK
TUN Tunisia .75 FR
TUR Turkey .5 FR
TWN Taiwan .25 GER
TZA Tanzania .25 UK
UGA Uganda .25 UK
URY Uruguary .5 FR
USA United States .25 UK
VEN Venezuela .25 FR
ZAF South Africa .5 UK
ZMB Zambia .5 UK
ZWE Zimbabwe .5 UK
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Figure 2: Private credit versus inquisitorial indicator
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Figure 3: Market capitalization versus inquisitorial indicator
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Table 3: Private credit versus inquisitorial indicator and several controls
Dependent variable: Private credit
log GDP pc 27.267 26.222 27.807 28.379
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
inquisitorial -28.020 -27.948 -24.794 -17.017
(0.030) (0.047) (0.075) (0.220)
creditor rights 2.728
(0.315)
legal justication -9.961
(0.281)
common law 14.600
(0.057)
constant -177.475 -173.536 -177.042 -198.163
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 98 86 98 98
adj. R2 0.445 0.448 0.446 0.464
p-values in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 4: Market capitalization versus inquisitorial indicator and several controls
Dependent variable: Market capitalization
log GDP pc 15.614 17.773 15.416 16.302
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
inquisitorial -33.682 -25.528 -34.789 -27.393
(0.004) (0.071) (0.005) (0.017)
anti self-dealing 34.983
(0.031)
legal justication 4.310
(0.558)
common law 8.567
(0.202)
constant -105.922 -141.353 -106.521 -118.336
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 92 68 92 92
adj. R2 0.290 0.369 0.284 0.297
p-values in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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